Introduction

1
The Combined Code of Corporate Governance, that was introduced in the UK in 1998, is widely regarded as an international benchmark for good corporate governance practice. The exibility it o ers to companies, who can choose between complying with its principles or explaining why they do not, stands in sharp contrast to mandatory systems (e.g. SarbanesOxley Act in the US). The merits of such exibility are thought to lie in its ability to encourage companies to adopt the spirit of the Code, rather than the letter, whereas a more statutory regime would lead to a \box-ticking" approach that would fail to allow for sound deviations from the rule and would not foster investors' trust. Therefore the \Comply or Explain" model ultimately would lead to better governance and its basic premise has been adopted by several other countries (like Austria and Germany). This article takes stock of the Combined Code's achievements in the UK; in particular, it asks whether it led to too much compliance and too few explanations.
We nd that the Code fostered compliance, especially in areas not covered by its forerunner, the Cadbury Code. For example, such provisions include the appointment of a senior independent non executive director or 12 months service contracts for executive directors. It is encouraging to see that more than half of the non nancial constituents of the FTSE350 were fully compliant with the Code at the end of 2004. In addition, we found that on average less than 10% of all rms were not complying to a given single provision.
However the picture looks less rosy when looking at those rms that did not comply with the provisions of the Combined Code. We nd that the rms that did not comply with the Code 1 often did a very poor job explaining themselves. Even worse, in almost one in ve cases of non-compliances, rms did not explain their non-compliances at all. When an explanation is provided, most of time it fails to identify speci c circumstances that could justify such a deviation from the rule. Companies that do not comply tend to stick with the same (poor) explanation until they directly jump to compliance. Once compliant, either a company remains compliant or if it ceases to, does not provide good explanations as to why this is the case.
This suggests that companies do not use the exibility of the Code to ne-tune their governance to their changing circumstances. Rather, rms often seem to make a fundamental choice between compliance or non-compliance.
Interestingly, shareholders seem to be indi erent to the quality of explanations, while the provision of speci c explanations is in fact a way to identify good investment strategies, better than simply focusing on compliance. Returns on a portfolio of compliers do not exceed, signi cantly, those of non-compliers. In contrast, returns of non-compliers di er signi cantly according to the quality of explanations.
In light of those ndings, we identify areas where the Code could be strengthened with greatest potential bene ts:
1. Provisions pertaining to the minimum percentages of non executive directors (at the time, one third) and independent non executive directors have the highest frequencies of compliance, above 95% in 2004. At the same time, in relation to these provisions, noncompliant rms are the most likely to give no explanation and the least likely to identify speci c justi cations. The latest revision of the Combined Code chose to make those provisions more stringent. This will presumably impact on compliance levels, whether the quality of justi cations of non-compliance will improve remains to be seen. An alternative route would have been to make those provisions compulsory for the remaining 5% of companies not already complying (and not explaining much). provision in relation to this principle, could have potentially signi cant bene ts. The overall message to be conveyed is that full compliance may not be desirable and that therefore explanations have to be analysed to identify the circumstances where noncompliance is in fact a superior way to govern a company.
2 The Combined Code.
The Combined Code was in operation from 31st December 1998 to 31st October 2004. Its provisions are summarised below. The rst eight provisions are the object of this analysis, while the last three were left out for the following reasons. All companies in the sample complied or intended to comply on provision 9, relating to Directors' re-election. Judging compliance with provision 10, pertaining to pay-linked to performance required additional information and/or analysis, not available to us. Provision 11, relating to internal control, had to be left out for the same reason as 10. The provisions 2 we analyse are thus the following:
1. Chairman and CEO (A.2.1) (CEO/COB): There are two key tasks at the top of every public company -the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company's business. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision.
2. Senior Non-executive Director (A.2.1) (SNED): Whether the posts (Chairman and CEO) are held by di erent people or by the same person, there should be a strong and independent non-executive element on the board, with a recognised senior member other than the chairman to whom concerns can be conveyed. The majority of non-executive directors should be independent of management and free from any business or other relationship, which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment. at least three directors, all non-executive, a majority of whom should be independent, with written terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties.
The next three provisions were not analysed, we list them for reference.
9. Director's re-election (A.6): All directors should be required to submit themselves for re-election at regular intervals and at least once every three years.
10. Pay-linked to performance (B.1): Levels of remuneration should be su cient to attract and retain the directors needed to run the company successfully, but companies should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A proportion of executive directors' remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance. The maximum number of instances of compliance in the sample is 10; 288 and we actually nd 8; 712 cases of compliance (resulting in an overall frequency of compliance of 84:7%). We rst look at the evolution of overall compliance over time and per company. Figure 1 shows that compliance increases every year over the time period, even though full compliance by all companies is not achieved. Compliance increased for all principles, except for that relating to the composition of audit committee, where it remained approximately the same 3 . Two out of eight principles have the maximum increase in compliance over that period: service contracts (from 35% to 80%) and senior non executive director (from 57% to 92%). Interestingly, these are the two principles which were either not present in the Cadbury code (SNED) or present at di erent levels (3 year length of service contract instead of 1 year).
Finally it is worth mentioning that no industry pattern can be detected but that levels of compliance are higher for FTSE100 companies.
3 The Cadbury code, that preceded the Combined Code, required the presence of at least three non executive directors on the audit committee; the Combined Code added that a majority of these should be independent.
The absence of signi cant changes in this provision could indicate that the impact of this additional requirement was marginal.
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In this section we investigate the quality of explanations. This requires some qualitative judgement on our part and necessarily contains some subjectivity. In order to maximise objectivity and clarity, we distinguish three categories.
The rst category is the most objective and easiest to verify: we identify the companies that do not comply and provide no explanation. This is the worst category if the quality of an explanation is to be judged by its ability to justify why non-compliance may be warranted.
The absence of any explanation is certainly not in spirit of the code, and it is not even in accordance with the letter because the code requires a narrative explanation to be given in case of non-compliance. Surprisingly, the absence of any explanation is quite common in the sample. For the entire period, almost one in ve instances of non-compliances (on average 17%) are not explained. This percentage remains relatively constant throughout the period, with a slight decrease towards the very end, as illustrated in Figure 3 . There is some variation in the frequency of the lack of explanations across principles (arrived at by taking averages over time). Figure 4 highlights that two contrasting trends can be seen.
First, three principles (those requiring one third of non executive directors, a majority of independent non executive directors, and remuneration committee consisting only of independent non executive directors) have more than 25% of their non-compliances not explained. Second, deviations from two principles (those requiring a majority of independent non executive direc-8 tors on audit committee and nomination committees) are explained in more than 90% of the cases. However, all principles su er from the absence of explanations to some extent.
Figure 4
We now discuss what constitutes good explanations and here some subjective judgement comes into play. We distinguish between good and bad explanations by searching for the presence of veri able 4 and speci c elements relating to the company's circumstances in the narrative statements. The following examples illustrate our typology.
Examples of explanations that we consider to be of good quality are for instance:
{ The Board has not at present formally appointed a senior independent director, other than the Chairman, to whom concerns can be conveyed. Three new non-executive directors have been appointed within the last 12 months, and it is considered that the Board should be given time to settle into its new composition prior to taking such a decision (BBA 1998). In contrast examples of explanations that do not identify special circumstances are as follows:
{ The Board has not identi ed a senior independent non-executive director, as speci ed by the Code, because it considers such an appointment to be unnecessary at present (Reuters 1999).
{ The board believes that this arrangements (i.e. service contracts superior to 12 months) are in the best interests of the company (Rentokil Initial 1998). Our classi cation of explanations is simple to implement and easy to replicate. We do not make any judgement as to whether the explanations provided are valid from a business perspective.
So, in that respect, our identi cation of good explanations can be termed optimistic. This classi cation method gives us two further groups of explanations that we refer as \speci c"
and \general".
There is a noticeable time trend that can be observed in the evolution of the quality of explanations as illustrated in gure 5. Explanations for non-compliance with the senior non executive director provision perform the best in the sample. Overall, they have the lowest percentage of general explanations (45%) and one of the lowest percentages of no explanations, so that in more than 40% of the cases of non-compliance the explanations are good. For the remaining principles, the frequency of good explanations is roughly about 20% except for nomination committee where good explanations appear only in 14% of the cases. These results have to be judged, in light of the fact that there are fewer companies which are not compliant with provisions relating to the audit, nomination and remuneration committee as compared to the provisions relating to the senior non executive director or to the length of service contracts.
We believe that one important determinant of the quality of explanations is their diversity.
For instance, in the case of the designation of a senior non executive director, companies o er a variety of circumstances to justify non-compliance: some companies point to the risk of division in the board, others to the existence of a strong non-executive presence on the board etc. In contrast, explanations regarding composition of remuneration committee many simply assert that this would not be in the company's interest or claim that the Chairman or the CEO should serve on the committee (without stating further reasons). The role of the diversity of explanations is also important in our view to assess the overall value of the \Comply or
Explain" approach as we will argue later.
In summary, when analysing any one of the eight principles we nd that out of one hundred should have a free hand to explain their governance policies in the light of the principles, including any special circumstances applying to them which have led to a particular approach.
It must be for shareholders and others to evaluate this part of the company's statement." If shareholders put no pressure on companies to provide better explanations, they are perfectly entitled not to do so 6 .
We are by no means the only ones to express the view that shareholders might not be exerting pressure towards better explanations. As recently as November 2nd, 2005, Richard Hopper, Chairman of Informa PLC, in his letter to the Financial Times, argued: \Explanations of noncompliance by companies are at best ignored by some shareholders organisations or at worst the company is criticised for not achieving a full set of ticked boxes."
We have statistical evidence suggesting that indeed little attention is paid to explanations, as opposed to compliance itself. Firstly, the quality of explanations at company level does not improve over time. Most companies in our sample start with some type of explanation and stick with that explanation until at some point they jump to full compliance. In other words, we do not observe companies providing general explanations moving towards speci c ones before ultimately complying. This evolution is not in contradiction with the fact that the average quality of explanations increases after 2001: the poor explainers became compliers at a quicker rate than non-compliers with better explanations. Put together these observations suggest that, if any pressure is put on non-compliers, it is directed towards compliance rather 6 It should be acknowledged that presumably nothing would be wrong with a company that would not comply and hardly explain in its annual reports, but in private discussions with its major shareholders would provide su cient justi cations. However, a company that can convince its shareholders that it has genuine reasons could easily provide those explanations in its annual reports, at no signi cant extra cost. Moreover, the disclosure of relevant information to some shareholders but not all, contains some legal risks.
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than quality of explanations.
Second, companies that cease to fully comply do not provide good explanations. In the whole sample, there is only one instance of a company which stops to comply and then provides a speci c, veri able explanation that was not purely transitory 7 (e.g. the company does not have a separate CEO and chairman of the board as a result of the CEO's resignation). In fact, most companies that stop complying on some principle, give no explanations. There could be two possible interpretations of this fact. It could be that those companies are unable to provide good explanations, because they do not have valid reasons to cease compliance. Or, it could be that they do have some, but do not take the step to state them in their annual reports. The rst interpretation suggests that there does not seem to be a set a recurrent circumstances under which, in the words of Sir Derek Higgs, \a valid exception to the sound rule" is warranted. The second interpretation is that there are some such circumstances, but can hardly be used in support of the \Comply or Explain" approach: the outcome would be the same without any regulation. The absence of explanations, while there could be some, suggest that shareholders do not pay much attention to those so that managers do not feel compelled to justify non-compliance.
Moreover, if there is shareholder pressure on corporate governance issues, this relates to compliance rather than explanations and usually takes place after periods of bad performance. We believe that Morrison's case illustrates some features common to many companies. In particular it demonstrates that the intervention by shareholders in matters of corporate governance is usually not pre-emptive but typically occurs post bad performance. This highlights a signi cant cost of the exibility o ered by the Code, in that shareholders' incentives to take pre-emptive actions are not fostered. Moreover this form of enforcement does not generate better quality explanations but instead invariably pushes towards full compliance.
7 The Value of Flexibility.
Our nal comments suggest some policy recommendations, with a caveat which is the exclusion of nancial service companies from our sample. The great achievement of the Code is in the very high number of compliances. But in light of our analysis, one might ask whether a less exible and a more statutory approach should be considered, at least in some areas.
As compared to a statutory regime a exible system like the Combined Code adds value if there are conditions under which one size does not t all. If there is full compliance, or if no meaningful explanations are observed (in case of non-compliance), the \explain" part of the code is ine ective. The relative bene t of exibility, relative to a statutory regime, must be therefore commensurate to the number of good explanations.
As compared to a statutory system, exibility also introduces the possibility that some companies do not comply without having any good reason for doing so. The option not to apply a principle in a exible system is thus put to bad use. This is most likely to be the case for companies that neither comply nor explain. The cost of exibility, relative to a statutory regime, must be thus commensurate to the number of non-compliances which are not explained.
In light of the above discussion we compile the ratio of the frequency of speci c explanations to the frequency of no explanations, for the each of eight provisions. Using this ratio we can evaluate the relative value of the Comply or Explain approach compared to a statutory approach. Figure 7 summarises our ndings.
Figure 7
This suggests that the value of exibility is the lowest for the provisions relating to one third of non executive directors, majority of independent non executive directors and composition of the remuneration committee. There are indeed more instances of no explanation than speci c ones for these provisions. Given that the high level of compliances for the rst two provisions (i.e. 98% and 95% respectively) not much would be lost if those provisions were made compulsory. In contrast, the number of speci c explanations signi cantly exceeds the number of no explanations for the provisions pertaining to senior non executive director and composition of the audit committee. As noticeably, those two provisions are those with the highest frequency of non-compliances, there the exibility, to comply or explain, might be of greater value.
Our above measure of the value of exibility might be imperfect. There could be at least two sources of noise in the calculations. It could be that there are some companies not complying for genuinely good reasons without explaining those circumstances. The puzzle there would be why could they not provide explanations of those circumstances. Symmetrically, there could be some explanations that we classi ed as good and are in fact not. In particular, the lack of diversity in explanations for certain principles might suggest that those explanations might not be so informative 8 . Moreover, one could argue that a compulsory regime which would recognise some well identi ed set of circumstances where companies would not be obliged to adopt a principle would not penalise those companies. So the relative bene t of the \Comply or Explain" approach measured by those explanations may overestimate the true contribution of this approach. But if those two sources of errors are not subject to systematic bias, i.e. more frequent for some unobserved companies' characteristics than for others, this ratio would still contain some meaningful information.
Finally, we have ignored what would happen to the companies currently complying if there was a move towards a statutory regime. Presumably nothing would change for those, as they would be complying under both regimes. There are two possible counter-arguments to this view. First, their conditions might change in the future. As already mentioned, the fact that we do not nd companies ceasing to comply and providing genuine explanations is suggestive that there may not be signi cant recurrent circumstances where ceasing to comply is needed (apart from unforeseen circumstances). Second, one could take the view that in the current state of a airs, too many companies comply. This argument is supported by our belief that shareholders' pressure is essentially targeted towards compliance, not explanations. Admittedly, a move towards a statutory regime can only make things worse in this perspective.
However, if one thinks that compliance has reached excessive levels, one also needs to recognise that the current approach su ers from some shortcomings: how to modify shareholders' attitude? The revised code suggests that institutional shareholders spell out in writing their dissatisfaction, if they are dissatis ed, with some explanations of non-compliers. This is likely to induce companies to provide better explanations and we believe constitutes a step in the right direction.
The market seems to have chosen compliance as the rule. However, there seems to be some misunderstanding as to what compliance entails. The Combined Code asks companies to either apply its provisions, or to explain why they do not. To be precise, both are valid ways of complying. It would therefore be more accurate, we feel, to refer to the approach as \Apply or Explain" , as this is what companies are asked to do. This admittedly minor change of terminology may help to promote the view among shareholders that greater attention has to be paid to explanations. It would recognise explicitly that companies that do one or the other de facto comply. One could then identify the \non-compliers" as the companies that do neither.
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